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Abstract
The paper is concerned with the issue of how the postsocialist new member states of 
the European Union fit into the established methodologies of worlds and varieties of 
welfare capitalism. The paper argues that the postsocialist welfare state is different 
from the welfare states of the old member states and does not resemble any of the four 
existing models as present in Europe. The welfare states of the EU-10 countries are 
much  smaller  than  those  in  the  western  half  of  the  continent  and  generally 
demonstrate much stronger emphasis on redistribution to prevent poverty. The EU-10 
are also highly internally differentiated as a group. We describe dimensions of welfare 
states in the new member states along three dimensions: size of the social protection 
expenditure,  redistributive  nature  of  the  social  transfers  and relative  redistribution 
effects based on the ratio between the first two variables. The size, and indirectly the 
shape, of the welfare state in the new member states is associated strongly with two 
factors: the size of the shock undergone by each economy during the transition and 
ethnic  heterogeneity,  particularly  with  regard  to  clearly  defined  and  marginalised 
minorities. Based on these findings, we suggest provisional division of the Central 
and Eastern European welfare states into five groups.  The provisional  typology is 
based on the three dimensions of the welfare state identified above and position of 
each group along these dimensions is associated with potential determinants discussed 
above.
Introduction
The paper is concerned with the issue of how the postsocialist new member states of 
the European Union fit into the established methodologies of worlds and varieties of 
welfare capitalism. For much of the transition, this was more or less ignored because, 
with the rapid social, economic and political transition in the countries concerned, it 
was  possible,  indeed  likely  that  they  would,  in  the  end  converge  to  one  of  the 
established ideal types. However, with transition progressing, the position has become 
untenable and a variety of views has emerged, ranging from identification of the new 
member states as belonging to the liberal or residual regime to a creation of a new 
post-socialist type.
In this paper, we claim that:
• Methods used for fitting countries into the existing welfare regime typologies 
cannot be used directly in the new member states due to different history 
• Alternative measure along three  dimensions  of  welfare  states  -  size of  the 
social protection expenditure, redistributive nature of the social transfers and 
relative redistribution effects based on the ratio between the first two variables 
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– can be used which adequately captures internal differentiation of the EU-10 
as a group
• the postsocialist welfare state is different from the welfare states of the old 
member  states  and  does  not  resemble  any of  the  four  existing  models  as 
present in Europe
• the welfare states of the EU-10 countries are much smaller than those in the 
western  half  of  the  continent  and  generally  demonstrate  much  stronger 
emphasis on redistribution to prevent poverty
• The size, and indirectly the shape, of the welfare state in the new member 
states is associated strongly with two factors: the size of the shock undergone 
by each economy during the transition and ethnic heterogeneity, particularly 
with regard to clearly defined and marginalised minorities. 
• A new typology, based on these findings, can be developed for the EU-10, 
which divides them into five groups. However, the typology should be further 
refined to deal with classification of countries in the middle between the other 
four types.
Welfare state typologies – a brief summary
In reality, welfare states are hardly ever pure types and are usually hybrids (Arts and 
Gelissen (2002)).  Nonetheless,  Abrahamson (1999)  notes  proliferation of  work on 
welfare state typologies, especially in the past two decades. Korpi (2000) suggests 
that the answer to their popularity lies in the fact that they serve as heuristic tools that 
allow  researchers  to  organize  and  interpret  information  available  in  comparative 
studies.
In analyzing welfare states, a variety of typologies is possible. Mitchell identifies five 
main approaches to the comparison of welfare systems: comparison of policy, inputs, 
production,  operations  and  outcomes.  (Mitchell  (1990))  Several  typologies  are 
possible  using  each of  these  approaches.  Pierson  (1995)  identifies  no  less  than 7 
criteria according to which welfare states can be distinguished: range, reach, quality, 
tools, financing, type of benefit and redistribution. Again, each of them lends itself to 
one or more typologies.
Nonetheless, much of the debate about welfare state typologies over the last 18 years 
has  revolved  around  the  typology  produced  by  Esping-Andersen  (1990).  This  is 
despite  the  fact  that  his  is  neither  the  first  (Abrahamson (1999)),  nor  universally 
accepted (Lewis (1992)).  Indeed, subsequent work tends to use Esping-Andersen’s 
work as the intellectual springboard regardless of whether it agrees or disagrees with 
him.
According to Esping-Andersen (1990), there are three models of welfare capitalism:
1. liberal welfare state (USA, UK, Canada, Australia, Ireland and New Zealand)
2. conservative welfare state (e.g. France, Germany, Austria, Belgium) 
3. social-democratic welfare state (Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland) 
The distinction is based on the dimensions of de-commodification, social stratification 
and public-private mix. They also reflect different political philosophies and traditions 
in the countries concerned, particularly the particular shape of the power structure 
during the welfare state creation: “The history of political class coalitions [is]  the 
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most decisive  cause of welfare state variations…It is a historical fact that welfare 
state  construction has  depended on political  coalition-   building.  The structure  of 
class-coalitions is much more decisive than are the power resources  of any single 
class.”  (Esping-Andersen 1990: 1,  30).  For example, in  continental  welfare states, 
“these  regimes  institutionalized  a  middle-class  loyalty  to  the  preservation  of  both 
occupationally segregated social-insurance  programs and, ultimately, to the political 
forces that brought them into being”. (Esping-  Andersen 1990: 31-32)
Of course, the whole Esping-Andersen typology is based on the assumption of path 
dependency.  Otherwise the social  and political developments a century ago would 
have little bearing on the current shape of the welfare state. Societal models, by their 
very nature, tend to be durable. Much research has been devoted to exploring why 
particular countries tend to adhere to different organizing paradigms even while they 
change many particular aspects of them in response to major internal and external 
shocks,  but  also  to  how  they  came  to  adopt  these  paradigms  in  the  first  place. 
(Titmuss (1974), Esping-Andersen (1990)) Most of the literature tends to see at least 
some role for path dependency effects (Pierson (2004)), where certain key decisions 
made at certain critical junctures structure and limit available choices for decades to 
come. (Though this should not be construed in an excessively rigid sense (see Crouch 
(2001).)
Empirically, organizing paradigms of welfare regimes applied in individual countries 
tend to  be very sticky,  which makes the issue  of  how the original  paradigm was 
selected  extremely  important.  At  the  same  time,  welfare  states  in  industrialized 
countries of Western Europe and North America have undergone significant changes 
during 1980s and 1990s, frequently labelled as “welfare state retrenchment”, (Pierson 
(1994)) even though it should be noted that the scholarly evaluation of the extent of 
these  changes  is  that  the  rhetoric  exceed  actual  change  (ibid.).  (Hacker  (2004) 
presents a counterargument, but it is more in terms of lack of new policy initiatives 
than dismantling existing policies.) Castles’ analysis (2004) confirms the hypothesis 
that the welfare state is not losing its position and that the welfare regimes are still 
keeping their specific profiles (‘steady state welfare state’) although there are some 
signs of convergence. 
Let  us  now turn to critiques  of  Esping-Andersen.  The critique of  the  mainstream 
typology comes in three basic shapes of increasing radicalism:
- critique pointing to specific deficiencies or arguing for new types. As Arts and 
Gelissen (2002) note, the most frequent criticisms concern identification by 
Esping-Andersen  of  the  Mediterranean  welfare  states  as  immature 
conservative  ones  and  the  labelling  of  the  Antipodean welfare  states  as 
belonging to the liberal regime type; Castles and Mitchell (1992, 1993) argue 
that liberal countries are highly diverse internally; Kwon (1997) tries to extend 
the typology to East Asia and ends up arguing for a new type for countries 
such as Korea and Japan.
While the Esping-Andersen typology has been subject to fierce critique (Abrahamson 
(1999) points to the excessive focus on social insurance, state and market on one hand 
and the neglect of personal social services and civil societal institutions on the other 
hand. Many scholars (e.g. Jenson (1997), Lewis (1992), Sainsbury (1999), Leitner 
(2003)) point to the missing gender dimension of the typology and have produced 
3
modifications or different typologies based on the inclusion of the gender aspect – see 
below  for  a  detailed  discussion,  Kasza  (2002)  argues  that  it  is  unlikely  that  any 
country will be close to the same type across major social and economic policies due 
to diverse histories of actors, policies and policy-making in different welfare fields. 
Bambra (2005) supports this view by a specific analysis of health care policies)
However, the Esping-Andersen typology remains dominant in comparative discourse 
on the welfare states The success of the typology is based not only on its intuitive 
appeal to comparative researchers, but also on the fact that it ties together a particular 
shape  of  the  welfare  state  with  the  political  and  social  history  behind  its 
establishment. It will therefore also be a point of reference for us in this paper even as 
we argue that the typology cannot be used in the new member states precisely because 
of its rootedness in the evolution of welfare states at the end of the 19th and the first 
half of the 20th century. However, we will utilise the additional Mediterranean type 
which Esping-Andersen originally classified as immature conservative type, but later 
research  has shown to be quite distinct in several respects. (Arts and Gelissen (2002))
Welfare states in the new EU members
Despite their common origin, nearly two decades of the transition, combined with 
some existing initial  differences,  have led to a high level  of differentiation in the 
current  shape of  postsocialist  countries  and their  welfare  states.  Some of  the new 
member states (Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia) have public expenditure levels 
and generosity of welfare states that in many respects approach (controlling for per 
capita income) the level of many old member states.  Indeed, the lowest  levels of 
inequality in the whole European Union are found in Nordic countries and then in the 
new members from Central  Europe. On the other  hand, in  the Baltic  countries or 
Romania, the situation is significantly different.  
There  has  been  a  relative  reluctance,  both  by  researchers  and  policy-makers,  to 
explore  these  differences,  conceptualize  them  and  examine  their  impact  at  the 
European and global level.2 There has also been only a limited theoretical debate on 
how  to  conclusively  classify  the  new  member  states  in  terms  of  existing  social 
models,  modified/expanded versions of the existing ones or completely new ones. 
However, as discussed in detail in the next section, this debate is currently under way 
and has already produced some results.
In our view, these conceptual simplifications have been caused by a combination of 
three factors:
• Transition and Europeanization. The new member states have been in flux for 
the last two decades both as a part of the transition process and, particularly in 
late  1990s  and  early  2000s,  as  a  part  of  the  EU  accession.  With  such 
dynamism,  any  conceptualization  risks  being  outdated  by  the  time  it  is 
finished;
2 An illustrative prominent example straddling both the policy and the research community is a paper 
by Andre Sapir on “Globalization and the Reform of European Social Models”, which was published 
both as a Bruegel Policy Brief in 2005 and in the Journal of Common Market Studies in 2006. In the 
(otherwise excellent and thought-provoking) paper, he uses (as an analytical shorthand) 4 social models 
of old member states based on a modified version of typology by Esping-Andersen (1990) and 
essentially ignores the new member states or any attempt at their conceptualization.
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• Apparent irrelevance of national political, economic and social context. Much 
of the social and economic change in the new member states has been driven 
by the inexorable forces of adjustment to market democracy, EU accession and 
globalization.  In  the  face  of  such  forces,  the  different  domestic  political, 
economic and social situation seems of minor importance;
• Dominance  of  country-based  (or  regionally-based)  research.  Much  of  the 
literature devoted to the topic has been country-based or looking at one of the 
sub-regions  of  the  larger  postsocialist  arena  (Central  Europe,  Baltics, 
Balkans); 
However,  this  paper argues that while  the process of social  and economic change 
never  stops,  the welfare regimes in the new member states  have assumed shapes, 
which  have  not  changed  in  a  significant  manner  during  the  recent  years  and  are 
unlikely to do so in the short-  to medium-term. Indeed, in an analogy to existing 
literature  on  welfare  state  retrenchment  in  OECD countries  (Pierson  (1994)),  the 
situation in the new member states is notable for how resilient the basic architecture 
of the welfare states has been once it settled down after the initial years of transition, 
despite the dramatic nature of the political discourse.3 
We will also argue against one homogenous model for all postsocialist welfare states. 
Domestic  political,  economic  and  social  context  is  relevant  for  the  shape  of  the 
welfare state. This claim, which would seem self-evident in the context of Western 
Europe, is also true for the new member states as shown by substantial differences in 
the shapes and internal logic of their welfare states. Originally clustered in several 
groups  with  different  developmental  paths,  the  postsocialist  countries  saw  their 
welfare state policies homogenized into what Titmuss (1963) called “Leninist welfare 
state” even though the extent of the homogenization should not be overstated (see 
Szelewa  (2007)).  During  1990s,  the  welfare  state  regimes  diverged  during  the 
transition  despite  similar  external  political  and  economic  environment.  (Aidukaite 
(1999, 2003 and 2006) 
In  other  words,  transition,  Europeanization  and  globalization  have  not  brought 
homogenization of  the  postsocialist  welfare  states,  instead,  significant  divergences 
despite similar original starting points (Aidukaite (2003), Sirovatka and Saxonberg 
(2006)). 
At  the  same  time,  the  speed  and  extent  of  the  overall  welfare  state  change  and 
retrenchment in all the new member states during the whole transition has few, if any 
parallels in experience of other countries (Vaughan-Whitehead (2003)). This is true 
even in countries with the smallest rupture with the pre-1989 shape of their welfare 
states (e.g. Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovenia). Therefore, while there has been 
a significant level of stability in the new paradigm, once it has been established, the 
changes involved in the rupture with the “Leninist” model have been of an order of 
magnitude greater than anything experienced in Western Europe or North America 
during 1980s and 1990s.
3 One exception where the political hype of change and policy reality match to some extent are the 
Slovak “reforms” of the 2002-2006 period, but even these reforms are an apex of a long-standing 
process and resulted only in a limited change in the shape of the welfare state.
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Many earlier  studies,  which  included  Eastern  Europe,  observed  the  welfare  state 
development  in  this  region  as  falling  (following  Esping-Andersen’s  or  Titmuss’ 
typologies) within the liberal or residual regime (see Ferge (1997, 2001); Standing 
(1996)), in which welfare is based on a mix of social insurance and social assistance, 
and a partial privatisation of social policy.  However,  it  should be pointed out that 
some of those studies tend to over-generalise and treat welfare state developments as 
if they were homogeneous throughout Eastern Europe (Aidukaite (2004), Fodor et al. 
(2002)). Kangas (1999) has concluded that to place the post-socialist countries in the 
prevailing  welfare  state  typologies  is  rather  problematic.  Other  studies  have  also 
emphasised  emerging  differences  among  Eastern  European  countries  (Manning 
(2004), Fodor et al. (2002)).
However, the recent attempts show that authors have been trying to group Eastern 
European countries into a distinct regime that does not fall into Esping-Andersen’s 
trilogy (see e. g. Aidukaite (2004); Kaariainen and Lehtonen (2006); Oorschots and 
Arts (2005); Wehner et al. (2004)). This regime is called Eastern European or post-
socialist  and  is  characterized  as  having  characteristics  from both  the  liberal  and 
conservative corporatist regimes as well as some distinct features of the post-socialist 
countries, such as high coverage, but relatively low benefit levels and low level of 
trust in state institutions. Nevertheless, the theoretical and empirical validity of the 
attempts to group these countries into distinct regime are rather weak, since these 
studies neither cover all countries, nor they are based on solid comparative data that 
prove the existence of the post-socialist (or Eastern European) welfare regime.  
Conceptual framework 
The  paper  argues  that  to  understand  the  postsocialist  wefare  state,  one  needs  to 
understand the forces that have shaped over the last two decades. To understand these 
force, we need to explore differences between individual countries and examine what 
they have in common and what is different.
However, the usual instruments used in analysing welfare regimes are less than useful 
in the case of postsocialist welfare states. This can be illustrated both for analysis of 
the shape of the welfare state and factors underpinning the welfare regime.
Let us start with the issue of how we define welfare state. For the EU-15 (and non-
European states), the literature generally rejects analysis based solely on the level of 
social  expenditure,  arguing  that  the  underlying  structure  of  the  welfare  state 
determines how the expenditure is  distributed and what  are  its  links to  the social 
structure (e.g. Esping-Andersen (1990)). Therefore, the Esping-Andersen typology is 
based  on  the  dimensions  of  de-commodification,  social  stratification  and  public-
private mix rather than on the level expenditure as such.
However, this does not mean that the level of expenditure is irrelevant. Table 1 shows 
the level of expenditure on social  protection by each EU-15 country colour-coded 
according to  a  modified Esping-Andersen  typology with  the  Mediterranean group 
added. As we can see, the social-democratic model is associated with high level of 
expenditure on social protection, followed by the conservative model and then the 
Mediterranean  model.  This  visual  interpretation  is  supported  by  the  fact  that 
correlation between the size of the social protection expenditure among the EU-15 
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countries and the welfare state type is relatively high at 0.65.4  However, this also 
indicates there are other variables that need to be taken into account.
Table 1: Social protection expenditure as % of GDP, 2005
Sweden 32
France 31.5
Denmark 30.1
Belgium 29.7
Germany 29.4
Austria 28.8
Netherlands 28.2
United Kingdom 26.8
Finland 26.7
Italy 26.4
Portugal 24.7
Greece 24.2
Luxembourg 21.9
Spain 20.8
Ireland 18.2
Source: Eurostat
Therefore, the size of the welfare state clearly matters with regard to typology. At the 
same  time,  we  would  argue  that  some  of  the  other  criteria  traditionally  used  to 
distinguish between different welfare regimes either cannot be applied in postsocialist 
countries or cannot be determined from the formal structure of the welfare states. 
Social stratification of the transition countries has been in tumult and there is no well-
developed conceptualization of the emerging class stratification that could be used for 
welfare regime analysis. Formal shapes of welfare systems are not very helpful for 
two reasons. First  of all,  most welfare states in Central and Eastern Europe are a 
mixture of other models in a way, which is rarely true in the EU-15 countries. More 
importantly, it can be quite misleading to look at the official structure of a particular 
subcomponent of a welfare system. For example, formally social insurance system 
can be in effect very close to residual and/or social-democratic depending on the level 
of  benefits  and “equalisation” between individuals  of varying incomes.  Therefore, 
decommodification can be better approximated by the level of expenditure than by the 
formal structure of the system
Looking at the social and political underpinnings of the welfare regime, the Esping-
Andersen typology and other political explanations of the differentiated shape of the 
EU-15 welfare state are also of limited direct utility. The transition has not been about 
construction of a welfare state, but about the reconstruction and downsizing of the 
Leninist welfare state.
For  this  reason,  we propose  to  replace  these  other  dimensions  by analysis  of  the 
redistributive effects of the welfare state that would complement the data about the 
social protection expenditure. These are the effect of the social protection expenditure 
on the level of poverty and the relationship between this impact and the size of the 
social  protection  expenditure.  At  the  same  time,  it  is  meaningful  to  look  at  the 
4 Liberal states are coded as 1, Mediterranean as 2, conservative as 3 and social-democratic as 4 for the 
purposes of correlation analysis.
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emerging public-private mix, primarily in the area of pensions, where all countries but 
the  Czech  Republic  and  Slovenia  have  established  compulsory  private  pension 
insurance of different sizes. 
Therefore, we propose to look at the shape of postsocialist welfare states using the 
following variables that should together provide a map of sufficient plasticity:
- social protection expenditure
- effect of the social protection expenditure on the level of poverty
- the relationship between the two previous variables 
- differences in  public-private  mix  as  measured by presence and size  of  the 
compulsory private pension pillar
The  paper  analyses  which  common  factors  can  account  for  commonalities  and 
differences  with  regard  to  these  variables.  We  are  going  to  investigate  three 
candidates:
- size of the transition economic shock
- ethnic  heterogeneity,  particularly  with  regard  to  marginalised  socially 
excluded groups
- poverty in the absence of social transfers
It  would  be  optimal  to  analyse  the  relationship  between  these  independent  and 
dependent variables using regression analysis, however, given the small size of the 
sample (10 countries), the validity of results would be questionable. Therefore, we 
prefer to use correlation analysis even though correlation between various pairs of 
variables  does  not  imply  causality  and  also  does  not  often  allow  to  disentangle 
multivariate relationships. Nonetheless, if results are interpreted conservatively and 
combined  with  qualitative  research,  they  can  provide  results  superior  to  purely 
qualitative analysis. 
In the analysis, we use the following dependent variables:
1. Welfare state size - social protection expenditure as a % of GDP and ratio  
between  social  protection  expenditure  and  the  overall  public  revenue  in  
2005
The two sets of data measure the share of the social protection expenditure in the 
overall  available  financial  resources  in  the  country  and  all  financial  resources 
available  to  the  government.  One  might  ask  why  public  revenue  rather  than 
expenditure is used for the second indicator. The reason is that public revenue is better 
for comparative purposes because it indicates resources that the public sector actually 
manages to extract from the economy. Public expenditure data, especially under the 
ESA95 methodology used in the EU, tends to be more volatile in new member states 
because they also frequently include non-cash one-time items (bank restructuring, 
PPP costs etc). 
The  data  show  range  of  12.4%  of  GDP to  23.4%  of  GDP,  a  difference  nearly 
equivalent to the one between the spending of the most and the least generous old 
member  states  (Sweden  at  32%  and  Ireland  at  less  than  19%).  This  indicates 
considerable variety between the new member states.
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Table 2: Social protection data, EU-10, 2005
Country Soc protection exp soc prot/revenue
Bulgaria 16.1 39.7
Czech Republic 19.1 46.3
Estonia 12.5 34.5
Hungary 21.9 51.3
Lithuania 13.2 40.1
Latvia 12.4 34.7
Poland 19.6 50.3
Romania 14.2 43.2
Slovenia 23.4 53.1
Slovakia 16.9 47.9
Source: Eurostat
2. Effect  of  social  protection  expenditure  on  inequality/poverty  –  absolute  
redistribution efforts
The second group of variables includes those measuring the effect of social protection 
expenditure  on  inequality/poverty.  Unfortunately,  the  only  available  data  set  that 
measures  this  effect  across  the  EU-10 is  the  influence  of  transfer  on  the  risk-of-
poverty. Therefore, we can only look at the effect of social protection expenditure on 
the inequality at the lower end of the income spectrum, not for the whole society. This 
measures the redistributive effects of social transfers. 
Table 3 presents at the data in four columns. The first one shows risk-of-poverty after 
all social transfers. The other three columns show the effect of social transfers on the 
risk-of-poverty indicator – for all transfers and dividing them into pensions and other 
transfers.
The size of  the transfer  effect  differs  considerably from Hungary,  where transfers 
decrease poverty by 33 percentage points, to Latvia, where they do so only by half of 
that  (17  percentage  points).  The  divergence  is  sharper  for  non-pension  transfers, 
where the difference between the largest effect (14% in Hungary) and the smallest one 
(3% in Bulgaria) is nearly 500%, whereas for the pensions,  the difference is only 
100%.
Table 3: Risk-of-poverty in EU-10 and influence of transfers, 2005
Decrease in risk-of-poverty due to
Country
Risk-of-
poverty pension All transfers
Non-pension 
transfers
Bulgaria 14 24 27 3
Czech 
Republic 10 17 29 12
Estonia 18 13 20 7
Hungary 16 19 33 14
Lithuania 20 14 21 7
Latvia 23 12 17 5
Poland 19 20 30 10
Romania 19 18 23 5
Slovenia 12 17 29 12
Slovakia 12 19 27 8
Source: authors based on Eurostat data
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3. Relationship between social protection expenditure and its effect on poverty 
– relative redistribution efforts
As we already mentioned, the social protection expenditure in itself shows only one 
dimension of the welfare system and that is its overall generosity. However, there can 
be important differences in how the expenditure is distributed to social groups, which 
form an important part  of the welfare regime typology.  The second indicator then 
measured the redistributive
Therefore,  we  supplement  the  data  on  generosity  and  redistributive  effort  of  the 
welfare system by a  synthetic  indicator comparing them. This indicator,  shown in 
Table 4, does not have any intrinsic explanatory value in itself, but comparison of 
values across countries is meaningful in showing whether the redistributive effect is 
proportional to the size of the social protection expenditure. 
For countries except Slovenia and Latvia, the ratio is between 1.5 and 1.7. The two 
countries have similar levels of poverty before transfers (40-41% of the population), 
but  while  Slovenia  has  the  highest  social  protection  expenditure  of  all  the  10 
countries, Latvia has the lowest.
However, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland are clustered around the 1.51-1.53 
range,  while  Estonia,  Lithuania,  Romania,  and Slovakia  cluster  around  1.59-1.62. 
Bulgaria is an outlier at the upper end, with 1.68. 
Table 4: Ratio of effect of social transfers on poverty to the size of social protection 
for EU-10 countries, 2005
Country Ratio
Bulgaria 1.68
Czech Republic 1.52
Estonia 1.6
Hungary 1.51
Lithuania 1.59
Latvia 1.37
Poland 1.53
Romania 1.62
Slovenia 1.24
Slovakia 1.6
Source: author, based on Eurostat data
In contrast the EU-15 countries have much lower though differing average scores. 
These show that the distance between the old and new member states is significant.
Table 5: Ratio of effect of social transfers on poverty to the size of social protection 
for EU-15 countries grouped according to the modified Esping-Andersen typology, 
2005
Welfare regime model Average ratio
Conservative 1.02
Liberal 1.03
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social democratic 0.94
Mediterranean 0.87
Source: author
4. Public/private mix in the pension system
The  issue  of  the  public/private  mix  is,  of  course,  relevant  for  the  whole  social 
protection expenditure, however an extensive privatization has occurred in the EU-10 
countries  only  in  the  area  of  pensions.  Therefore,  we  use  the  indicator  on  the 
introduction and the size of the compulsory private pension pillars as a proxy for the 
public/private mix in welfare.
Table 6 shows the data. Except for the Czech Republic and Slovenia, all the countries 
have  privatized  parts  of  their  pension  system,  but  the  extent  differs  from 5% in 
Bulgaria to 9% in Slovakia.
Table 6: Introduction and size of the compulsory private pension system
Country Compulsory private pension  pillar introduction Size of the contributions (% of wages)
Bulgaria 2001 2% (increasing to 5% by 2005)
Czech 
Republic Not introduced -
Estonia 2002 6%
Latvia 2001 2% (increasing to 10% by 2010)
Lithuania 2004 2.5% (increasing to 5.5% by 2007)
Hungary 1998 6% (originally intended to increase to 8% in 2002)
Poland 1999 7.20%
Romania 2008 2% (increasing to 6% by 2016)
Slovakia 2005 9%
Slovenia Not introduced -
Source: Beblavý and Žitňanský (2008)
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We  now  present  the  independent  variables,  which  we  believe  can  explain  the 
differentiation  in  the  dependent  variables  and  thus  the  differentiation  in  welfare 
systems in the new member states.
1. the size of the transition economic shock 
The first potential explanation development of the postsocialist welfare state is the 
size of the transition economic shock. The logic is as follows: unlike their Western 
counterparts,  the  governments  of  transition  countries  faced  significant  liquidity 
constraints during 1990s and the size of the shock to the country’s economy was a key 
determinant  in  how  severe  the  these  constraints  would  be.  Countries  facing  an 
unusually severe and sustained downturn of their economies had to, sooner or later, 
overhaul their fiscal policy to adjust to their means. Since social expenditure is one of 
the key elements of the public expenditure, it had to participate, to some degree in the 
adjustment. Due to path dependency effects, once the size of the welfare state was 
adjusted to these conditions, it did not change subsequently in a major way even if the 
economic  conditions  changed.  Therefore,  the  size  of  the  initial  downturn  is  an 
important determinant of the overall shape of the welfare state up to this day. 
Table 7 shows three possible ways of measuring the size of the shock. They are all 
based on comparing the developments in GDP with pretransition developments (year 
1990). The first indicator measures what was the lowest point in economic output 
(which was reached in different years in different countries). The other two measure 
average  values  in  the  first  five  or  ten  years  of  transition.  Together,  they provide 
relatively robust indicators of the size of the transition economic shock.
As  we  can  see,  Poland  faced  the  smallest  shock,  from which  it  recovered  most 
quickly. Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia also did not see their economies drop 
dramatically, though they took somewhat longer to recover. Bulgaria, Romania and 
Slovakia  faced  more  serious  downturns  with  more  lasting  consequences  though 
Slovakia managed to recover more quickly than the rest. And the three Baltic states 
faced dramatic drops in their economic production, from which they did not recover 
during the whole first transition decade. 
Table 7: Size of the transition economic shock 
GDP trough
average GDP 
91-95
average GDP 
91-00
Bulgaria 0.76 0.87 0.84
Czech Republic 0.88 0.9 0.94
Estonia 0.69 0.75 0.79
Hungary 0.85 0.87 0.93
Lithuania 0.56 0.68 0.67
Latvia 0.5 0.6 0.59
Poland 0.93 1 1.16
Romania 0.79 0.84 0.85
Slovenia 0.86 0.91 1.01
Slovakia 0.79 0.84 0.94
Source: author, based on UN data
2. Ethnic heterogeneity
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Ethnic heterogeneity has been used to explain differences between the generosity of 
welfare  states,  particularly  between  the  US  and  Western  Europe  (Gilens  (1999), 
Alesina and Edward Glaeser (2004) though others see a need for a more nuanced view 
(Soroka et al. (2004))
Since many of the new member states have large minorities, which differ from the 
majority population in terms of employment, poverty and exclusion, it is a topic worth 
investigating. 
The  structure  and  generosity  of  the  welfare  system  can  be  related  to  the  ethnic 
heterogeneity of the country due to the nature of solidarity in a society. If “others”, 
particularly “undeserving” others are seen as benefitting disproportionately from the 
welfare  state,  this  can  weaken  support  for  the  social  protection  expenditure. 
Additionally, if the minorities are socially and politically marginalised, their ability to 
influence the shape of the welfare state can be limited. 
To measure the ethnic heterogeneity, we divide the 10 countries into four countries 
depending  on  the  level  of  ethnic  heterogeneity  as  measures  by  the  share  of 
marginalised ethnic groups in the population, as shown in Table 8. Those, where there 
is no significant minority group associated with exclusion and poverty  - Poland and 
Slovenia – get the lowest  ranking. In the Czech Republic, Hungary Lithuania and 
Slovakia,  the  share  of  such  groups  is  small,  but  relevant  –  up  to  10%  of  the 
population. These are Roma except for Lithuania, where the relevant minority are 
Russians.  In  Bulgaria  and  Romania,  the  share  of  the  minorities  –  Roma and  (in 
Bulgaria) Turks – exceeds 10%, but is less than 20%. Finally, in Estonia and Latvia, 
the Russian minority represents a significant percentage of the population and exceeds 
20%. 
Table 8: Ethnic heterogeneity in the EU-10 countries
Level of ethnic heterogeneity Country The minority group
None Poland -
Slovenia -
Low – up to 10% Czech Republic Roma
ˇ Hungary Roma
Slovakia Roma
Lithuania Russian
Medium – 10 – 20% Bulgaria Turks/Roma
Romania Roma
High – more than 20% Estonia Russian
Latvia Russian
Source:  author  based  on  Census  data  for  non-Roma  population  and  Rorke  and 
Wilkens (2006) data for Roma
The classification excludes those minority groups, which are not subject to obvious 
marginalisation – Hungarians in Romania and Slovakia. However, even if these were 
included, the classification would change only marginally – Slovakia would move 
from low to medium heterogeneity and Romania would not move at all. 
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It is worth noting that in the case of Roma, the estimates are not based on the official 
census  data  as  these  tend  to  underreport  the  Roma numbers,  but  are  an  average 
estimate of OSCE and human rights groups. (Rorke and Wilkens (2006))
3. poverty/inequality before transfers
The third potential factor investigated in the paper is the extent of poverty before 
transfers, which could conceivably drive the size and structure of the welfare state if 
these variables respond to social need rather than other factors. Data about the risk-of-
poverty before social transfers measures acuteness of inequalities at the lower end of 
the income spectrum. It is shown in Table 9.
Table 9: Risk-of-poverty before social transfers in EU-10, 2005
Country Risk-of-poverty rate before transfers
Bulgaria 41
Czech Republic 39
Estonia 38
Hungary 49
Lithuania 41
Latvia 40
Poland 49
Romania 42
Slovenia 41
Slovakia 39
Source: Eurostat
Analysis of the data
In  the  analysis  we  start  by  looking  at  the  relationship  between  the  independent 
variables  and  the  social  protection  expenditure.  Two  of  the  three  independent 
variables have very high correlation with the social protection expenditure in 2005:
The first is the size of the initial transition shock as measured by the drop in GDP per 
capita compared to 1990. The correlation between the size of the shock and the share 
of social protection in GDP ranges between 0.77 and 0.8, and the correlation between 
the size of the shock and the share of social protection in the overall public revenue  is 
between 0.79 and 0.83. It is also important to note that the size of the initial shock is 
not  associated  with  subsequent  pre-transfer  inequality  (on  the  contrary,  there  is  a 
weaker opposite correlation ranging from -0.46 to -0.51 between the two variables). 
Therefore, the relationship between the initial shock and the subsequent developments 
in social protection expenditure seem to be driven by economic limits rather than the 
social impact.
The second is the ethnic heterogeneity, particularly with regard to existence of distinct 
marginalised groups. The correlation between ethnic heterogeneity and the share of 
social protection in GDP is -0.8, while the correlation between ethnic heterogeneity 
and the share of social protection among all public expenditure is -0.9 (even if all 
ethnic heterogeneity was taken into account, the correlations would still be -0.8 and 
-0.83)
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Poverty  levels  before  transfers  are  correlated  with  the  level  of  social  protection 
expenditure (0.51), but the correlations is weaker than for the preceding two factors. 
Therefore,  we  can  posit  that  a  combination  of  these  two  factors  –  initial 
transition shock and ethnic heterogeneity) – is more strongly associated with the 
size of the social protection expenditure than the levels of pre-transfer poverty. 
These findings cannot be compared with the EU-15 countries as they have obviously 
not undergone the transition shock. 
Now we progress to the analysis of the redistributive nature of the social protection 
expenditure.
We find that in the EU-10 countries the size of the social protection expenditure 
is strongly associated with redistributive effects of social transfers, particularly 
with regard to non-pension social transfers. The correlation between the size of the 
social protection expenditure and the decrease in poverty due to all transfers is 0.91. 
When the correlation is disaggregated between pension and non-pension transfers, the 
correlation for pensions is 0.48 and for other transfers is 0.81. In other words, size of 
the  social  protection  expenditure  is  strongly  associated  with  absolute 
redistributiveness of the system represented by effects of transfers on poverty. This 
general  feature  of  the  EU-10  countries  is  stronger  than  in  the  EU-15  states, 
particularly for non-pension transfers, where the correlation is 0.7 for all transfers, 
0.31 for pensions and 0.41 for other transfers. 
This picture is complemented by the ratio of the effect of social transfers on poverty 
to  the  size  of  social  protection  expenditure,  which  is  a  measure  of  relative 
redistribution  of  the  welfare  system.  The  ratio  has  no  correlation  with  either  the 
economic  shock  of  transition  or  the  poverty  rate  before  transfers.  However,  it  is 
weakly correlated with the ethnic heterogeneity (0.29). Therefore, we also find that 
while the economic shock of transition is strongly associated with the size of the 
welfare state and that has important implications for the absolute redistributive 
effects, it has no correlation with the relative measure of redistribution though 
there is a weak relationship with ethnic heterogeneity. 
The ratio is also much higher than for the EU-15 countries, where the range for the 
EU-15 is 0.79 (Greece) to 1.22 (Germany) whereas the EU-10 countries, with the 
exception of Latvia and Slovenia, cluster between 1.5 and 1.7. Therefore, the much 
smaller  welfare  states  of  the  EU-10  countries  generally  demonstrate  more 
emphasis  on  redistribution  to  prevent  poverty  than  the  EU-15  countries. 
However, we find internal differentiation where the Czech Republic,  Hungary and 
Poland have relatively larger  and somewhat  less  redistributive  welfare  states  than 
Estonia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia. The exceptions are Slovenia and Latvia. 
Slovenia reaches the lower end of the EU-15 social protection expenditure and also of 
the limited redistribution. On the other hand, Latvia presents an example otherwise 
unseen in the European Union – a very small welfare state that ignores redistribution. 
Lastly, the private/public mix can be only partially explained by independent variables 
– only those countries with relatively small shocks and no or low ethnic heterogeneity 
(Czech  Republic,  Slovenia)  have  not  established  the  compulsory  private  pension 
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pillar. However, this does not explain why Poland and Hungary, two countries which 
fit both criteria have established relatively sizeable private pensions schemes.
Conclusion - towards a welfare state typology for postsocialist welfare states
In the absence of comparable data and history, we used slightly different instruments 
from those used in traditional analysis of welfare states to ascertain their shapes in the 
new member states from Central and Eastern Europe and to determine whether they 
show important  differences  compared  to  the  old  member  states  and  what  factors 
account for their developments. 
Our conclusions can be grouped into two parts.
First  of  all,  we  conclude that  the  postsocialist  welfare  state  is  different  from the 
welfare states of the old member states and does not resemble any of the four existing 
models as present in Europe. The welfare states of the EU-10 countries are much 
smaller  than those in the western half  of the continent  and generally demonstrate 
much stronger emphasis on redistribution to prevent poverty. 
In the second part, we focused on finding explanation for the size and the shape of the 
postsocialist welfare states and to make a stab at potential factors underlying a new 
typology for the new member states.
Our conclusion is that the size, and indirectly the shape, of the welfare state in the 
new member states is associated strongly with two factors:
• the size of the shock undergone by each economy during the transition 
• ethnic  heterogeneity,  particularly  with  regard  to  clearly  defined  and 
marginalised minorities
We also find that the size of the social protection expenditure is strongly linked to its 
redistributive  nature  of  the  social  transfers  (what  we  call  absolute  redistributive 
dimension), but that the EU-10 countries are internally differentiated, with stronger 
relative redistribution effects for Baltics (except for Latvia), Bulgaria, Romania and 
Slovakia  and weaker  for  the  Czech Republic,  Hungary,  Poland,  while  Latvia  and 
Slovenia  present  outliers  with  very  weak  relative  redistribution  effects  of  social 
protection. 
We also find that the economic shock of transition has no correlation with the relative 
measure  of  redistribution or  the  risk-of-poverty before  transfers  though there  is  a 
weak relationship with ethnic heterogeneity.
Based on these findings, we suggest division of the Central and Eastern European 
welfare states into five groups shown in Table 10. The typology is based on the three 
dimensions of the welfare state identified above and position of each group along 
these dimensions is associated with potential determinants analysed in the paper. The 
term “potential  determinants” is  used because the established correlation does  not 
prove causation.
Table 10: Five types of welfare regime in the new member welfare states
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Dimensions of the welfare state Potential  determinants  of 
welfare  state  size  and 
shape
Type Countries Size  of 
social 
protection 
exp
Absolute 
redistributive 
effort
Relative 
redistributive 
effort
Economic shock Ethnic 
heter.
Invisible Latvia L L L H H
Liberal light Estonia, 
Lithuania
L L H H H
Uncertain 
middle
Bulgaria, 
Romania, 
Slovakia
M M H M L/M
Conservative 
light
Czech 
Republic, 
Hungary, 
Poland
H H M L 0/L
Nearly 
conservative
Slovenia H H L L 0
Source: author
The “invisible” group contains Latvia and the term is used because Latvia provides a 
unique combination of a very small welfare state with much smaller redistributive 
efforts than its peers.
The “liberal light” group contains Estonia and Lithuania and the term is used because 
their  residual  welfare state  is  much smaller  than those of  European states  usually 
classified in the residual model.
The “conservative light” group contains the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland and 
the term is used because the combination of its features resembles the conservative 
model, but with much smaller size.
Slovenia is classified in a group of its own as “nearly conservative”  because the size 
and shape of its welfare state puts it closer to some EU-15 countries (e.g. Germany, 
Austria) that to the other EU-10 countries. 
Bulgaria,  Romania  and  Slovakia  are  in  the  “uncertain  middle”  between  the  two 
categories and their classification is, to a certain degree, in the eyes of the beholder. 
Therefore, this typology should be seen as a provisional as it does not provide clear 
guide to the classification of these “middle” countries.
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